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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Anxiety has been described as the most pervasive psychological 
phenomenon of our time {Hoch & Zubin, 1950). These authors go on further 
to state that if anxiety could be controlled by biological or social 
means, fundamental alternations in the organization of our civilization 
would ensue, and the probability of individual happiness would be greatly 
enhanced .• 
Anxiety and fear have long been recognized as fundamental human 
emotions. The concept of fear, according to Cohen (1969), is clearly 
reflected in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics. James Kritzeck, of the 
Department of Oriental Studies at Princeton, noted a central concern 
with anxiety in the work of medieval Arab philosopher, Ala Ibn Hazm, of 
Cordova. In a treatise called "A Philosophy of Character and Conduct," 
written in the eleventh century, Ibn Hazm unequivocally asserts the 
universality of anxiety as a basic condition of human existence (cited 
by Spielberger, 1972). 
Spielberger (1966) states that the conceptual status of anxiety 
contains a certain degree of ambiguity. This ambiguity arises from the 
more or less indiscriminate use of the term to ref er to two very differ-
ent types of concepts. Anxiety, in an empirical sense, is most often 
used to denote a complex reaction or response--a transitory state or 
condition of the organism fluctuating in strength and time. However, 
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the term anxiety is also used to refer to a personality trait--to indi-
vidual differences in the extent to which different people are char-
acterized by anxiety states and by prominent defenses against such states 
(Spielberger, 1966). 
Anxiety is an important construct in theories of behavior, ranging 
from psychoanalysis to learning theory, and most authors tend to use a 
theoretically derived definition, although some use empirically derived 
definitions. The comparability of findi.ngs from different studies i.s 
not only complicated by difference in theoretical definitions, but also 
by differences in operational criteria from study to study within the 
same theoretical framework (Ruebush, 1963). For purposes of the study 
I 
the writer has chosen. Spielberger's (1972, p. 10) definition of anxiety 
as a "transitory emotional state consisting of feelings of apprehension, 
tension, and autonomic nervous system arousal (A-state) or as a rel-
atively consistent elevated individual level of anxiety proneness 
(A-trait)." 
The definition of modeling chosen by the writer is one proposed by 
Flanders (1968): 
An observer is said to imitate a model when observation of the 
behavior of the model, or of expressions attributing certain 
behavior to the model, affects the observer so that the 
observer's subsequent behavior becomes more similar to the 
observed, or alleged, behavior of the model (p. 316). 
For purposes of this study the term modeling will be considered synon-
ymous with imitation, identification, social, and observational learn-
ing. 
One of the fundamental means by which new modes of behavior are 
acquired and existing patterns are modified entails modeling and vicar-
ious processes (Bandura, 1969). Research conducted within the framework 
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of social-learning theory demonstrates that virtually all learning 
phenomena resulting from direct experiences can occur on a vicarious 
basis through observation of another personts behavior and its con-
sequences for them (Bandura, 1965a; Bandura & Walters, 1963). Thus, one 
can acquire intricate response patterns merely by observing the per-
formances of appropriate models; emotional responses can be conditioned 
observationally by witnessing the affective reactions of others under-
going painful or pleasurable experiences; fearful and avoidant behavior 
can be extinguished vicariously through observation of modeled approach 
behavior toward feared objects without any adverse consequences accruing 
to the performer; inhibitions can be induced by witnessing the behavior 
of others punished; and, finally, the expression of well learned 
responses can be enhanced and socially regulated through the actions of 
influential models. Modeling procedures are therefore ideally suited 
for affecting diverse outcomes, including elimination of behavioral 
deficits, reduction of excessive fears and inhibitions, and social 
facilitation of behavioral patterns on a group-side scale (Bandura, 
1969). 
Anxiety and Modeling 
Recent research on modeling has been provocative because it has 
suggested the important role which the observation of others plays in 
influencing social behavior (Bandura, 1965). There has been a plethora 
of research on modeling, with many different variables being studied--
sex (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963a), age (Hicks, 1965), and social power 
of the model (Mischel & Grusec, 1966) are some examples of the various 
characteristics that have been studied to determine their effects on 
modelings. It has been found, for example, that the social power or 
prestige of the model is a very important determinant in whether or not 
the observer will imitate the modelts behavior. Numerous studies have 
found that models of high prestige are imitated to a greater degree 
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than low prestige models (Harvey & Rutherford, 1969; Lefkowitz, Blake & 
Mouton, 1953; Bandura & Kuper, 1963). Characteristics of the observer, 
such as dependency (Ross, 1966), self-esteem (Gelfand, 1962), and racial 
status (Beyer & May, 1968) have been studied. Yet another character-
istic of the observer that has been studied in terms of its effects on 
the modeling situation is anxiety. There is evidence that emotional 
arousal, whether induced by stressful external conditions or by use of 
drugs, can increase the probability and degree of changes in social 
behavior, and that the direction which such changes take may often be 
specified by the cues provided by a model (Schacter & Wheeler, 1962; 
Walters, Marshall & Shooter, 1960; Bauer, 1978). 
Imitation behavior has been studied in terms of how it is affected 
by characteristics of the observer. The literature, however, contains 
little information concerning the effects of varying characteristics of 
the model and the observer simultaneously. The purpose of the present 
study is to do precisely that. This study will attempt to determine the 
effects that various levels of state and trait anxiety in the observer 
have on the imitation of models with varying levels of prestige. Knowl-
edge concerning this relationship could have implications in various 
fields. In the field of education, for example, the modeling of certain 
behaviors or tasks by the instructor may constitute a very important 
means of aiding students. Knowledge of this relationship could also be 
important in therapy. Since most clients are somewhat anxious, the 
possibility of the therapist serving as a model for certain behaviors 
should be entertained. The anxiety/prestige of model relationship may 
be important in deciding just how one can most affect the client, i.e., 
how important is "power" or prestige of the therapist in the client/ 
therapist dyad. 
One must realize, however, that the findings of one study concern-
ing the anxiety/modeling relationship cannot suggest anything definite 
about this relationship, nor about its application. Further studies 
would be needed to develop information that would be likely to general-
ize to school and therapy settings. 
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CHAPTER II 
SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW 
What follows is a selected review of the literature in the areas 
of anxiety and modeling. The articles/studies selected pertain either 
directly or indirectly to this study. 
Definitions of Anxiety 
Anxiety is one of the terms in most frequent current use by 
researchers in psychology. It is also a term whose definition varies 
considerably among authors. Frued (1924) described anxiety as an 
unpleasant affective state, This state, as he observed it in patients 
who suffered with anxiety neuroses, was characterized by all that is 
covered by the word "nervous." According to May (1950), anxiety is the 
apprehension cued off by a threat to some value which the individual 
holds essential to his or her existence as a personality. Spielberger 
(1966) felt that anxiety could either denote a transitory state (state 
anxiety) or ongoing, consistent pers.onality trait of the organism (trait 
anxiety). For purposes of this study, Spielberger's definitions have 
been accepted. 
The Trait-State Theory of Anxiety 
The trait-state theory of anxiety gives anxiety a two-part concep-
tual status. This includes what is referred to as "trait," "neurotic," 
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or "chronic" anxiety, and what is called "state," "objective," or 
"situational" anxiety. Trait anxiety is dispositional in nature, is 
construed or "situational" anxiety. Trait anxiety is dispositional in 
nature, is construed to be a proneness to be anxious, and has an in-
ternalized locus. State anxiety is situational in nature, is directly 
a function of stressful conditions, and has a contemporary locus 
. (Spielberger, 1972). Research has confirmed expectations that trait 
anxiety is relatively stable over time and that state anxiety is less 
stable (King, Heinrich, Stephenson & Speilberger, 1976). 
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The methodological distinction between trait and state forms of 
anxiety was first made by Zuckerman (1960) when he devised the Affect 
Adjective Check List (AACL). Zuckerman and Lubin (1965) added scales 
for depression and hostility to the AACL, and the resultant trait-state 
test was called the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL). 
Speilberger (1966) developed a trait~state theory of anxiety. The trait 
and state forms of the MAACL were used by Spielberger to test predic-
tions from the theory. Later Speilberger, Gorsuch and Luskene (1970) 
developed their own State Trait Anxiety Index (STAI) for this type of 
study. 
Until recently, personality psychology has been preoccupied with 
the measurement of trait anxiety. The traditional anxiety test, whether 
objective or projective, typically yields a general trait assessment 
which ignores the specificities of individual response and situations. 
What has been neglected is the measurement of transitory states and 
change as the situation is modified (Zuckerman & Spielberger, 1976). 
In general, it would be expected that those who are high in trait 
anxiety (A-Trait) will exhibit state anxiety (A-State) elevations more 
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frequently than low A-Trait individual because they tend to react to a 
wider range of situations as dangerous or threatening. The experimental 
literature on anxiety is consistent with the hypothesis that situations 
which pose direct or implied threats to self-esteem produce differential 
levels of A-State in persons who differ in A-Trait. Differences in the 
performance of high and low A-Trait individuals on learning tasks, for 
example, are most often found under conditions that involve failure 
experiences or "ego-involving" instructions (Spence & Spence, 1966). 
Furthermore, circumstances that involve the risk of failure, such as 
academic achievement situations (Mandler & Sarason, 1952), or in which 
an individual's personal adequacy is evaluated, e.g., taking an intel-
ligence test, appear to be especially threatening to persons with high 
A-Trait (Denny, 1966; Spielberger & Smith, 1966). The correlation 
between the state and trait anxiety depends upon the type and the amount 
of stress that characterize the conditions under ~hich the A-State scale 
is given. Correlations between the scales varied between .44 and .55 
when the STAI was given to four different samples of female undergrad-
uates; the correlation between the scales for males in these samples 
varied between .51 and .67 (Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970). 
With regard to the origin and etiology of individual differences in 
A-Trait, it is assumed that residues of past experience dispose high 
A-Trait persons to appraise situations that involve some form of per-
sonal evaluation as more threatening than do individuals who are low in 
A-Trait. Spielberger (1972) speculated that childhood experiences 
influence the development of individual differences in A-Trait. Espe-
cailly important in this regard are parent-child relationships center-
ing around punishment. 
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Existing studies of anxiety literally defy sunnnary as a unit 
(Sarason, 1960). It is possible, however, to discern trends in various 
areas pertinent to this study. What follows is a review of the relation-
ship between anxiety and certain selected behavior correlates. 
The Effects of Anxiety on Self-Concept 
and Self-Confidence 
Several studies have obtained significant relationships between 
anxiety and measures which reflect a negative conception of the self or 
a tendency towards self-disparagement (Doris, 1959; Lipsitt, 1959; 
Walsh, 1956). Clark and Arkowitz (1975) found that high-anxious sub-
jects were more likely to underestimate positive aspects of their per-
formance and overestimate the negative aspects of their behavior. In 
a review of the literature on paper-and-pencil anxiety scales, Sarason 
(1960) cited a number of studies (Bendig, 1958; Trapp & Kausler, 1958; 
Wolf, 1955) that provide evidence that high-anxious subjects are more 
self-deprecatory, more self-preoccupied, and generally less content 
with themselves than subjects lower in the distribution of anxiety. 
Numerous studies have shown that the anxious person tends to have 
a poor self-concept and lacks self-acceptance. It would seem to follow 
that another characteristic of the anxious subject would be lack of 
confidence in oneself. Studies by Gaudry and Poole (1973) and Meunier 
and Rule (1967) have indeed found that level of confidence is inversely 
related to anxiety. In summary, it appears that an anxious subject 
has low self-esteem and lacks confidence in his or her ability. 
The Effects of Anxiety on Dependency 
and Suggestibility 
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There is ample evidence of a positive relationship between anxiety 
and dependency (Heathers, 1954; Walters, Marshall & Shooter, 1960; 
Walters & Ray, 1960). Sarason, Davidson, Lighthall, Waite, and Ruebush 
(1960) and Hill and Sarason (1966) suggest that a high test-anxious 
child has strong dependency needs and that these needs partially mediate 
the interfering effect of test anxiety for such children. 
In an earlier experiment it was shown that high-anxious children 
were more suggestible than were low-anxious children (Jakubczak & 
Walters, 1959). Walters et al. (1960) have s~own that subjects who 
have been exposed to an anxiety-producing situation are more suggestible 
than subjects not exposed to such a situation. An analysis of exper-
imental procedures used in studies of suggestibility supports an inter-
pretation of suggestibility as a form of dependency behavior (Asch, 
1940; Sherif, 1935). Similarly, Jakubcazk and Walters (1959), in expos-
ing groups of high- and low-dependent children to the autokinetic 
effect, found that high-dependent subjects were significantly more sug-
gestible than low-dependent subjects. In general, studies seem to indi-
cate a very strong relationship between level of anxiety and the traits 
of dependency and suggestibility. 
The Effects of Anxiety on Susceptibility 
to Persuasion and Social Influence· 
Janis (1955) hypothesized that persons who are exceptionally lack-
ing in a sense of personal adequacy are excessively fearful of social 
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disapproval and, therefore, are strongly motivated to conform with de-
mands and suggestions of others. Under the assumption that a high 
degree of anxiety entails feelings of shyness, fear of being criticized, 
and low self-confidence in relationships with other people, Janis (1955 
studied the relationship between anxiety and susceptibility to persua-
sion. The results of the study showed that people high in anxiety were 
more predisposed to be influenced by persuasive communication. Fine 
(1957) found that opinion change in subjects high in inferred anxiety 
was greater than those low in anxiety. Anxiety has been found to be 
positively related to suggestibility in an autokinetic situation 
Walters et al., 1960) and to susceptibility to propaganda (Janis & 
Feshback, 1953). 
A number of studies have reported that under anxiety arousing condi-
tions subjects tend both to seek out the company of others and to become 
increasingly susceptible to social influence (Schacter, 1959; Walters & 
Karal, 1960). Gerard (1963) suggests that evaluational uncertainty 
regarding some aspect of the self produces a desire to compare oneself 
with others. Along a similar vein, Walters, Bowen, and Parke (1964) 
reported that emotionally aroused subjects are especially likely to rely 
on the behavior of others for indications as to how they should respond. 
In summary, research seems to indicate that arousal or anxiety leads 
to: (1) an increased susceptibility to social influence and (2) a desire 
to affiliate. 
Theoretical Viewpoints on Modeling 
The earliest formulations, dating back to Morgan (1896), Tarde 
(1903) and McDougall (1908), regarded modeling as an innate propensity. 
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These instinctual interpretations discouraged empirical investigations 
of the conditions under which modeling occurs. As the instinct doctrine 
fell into disrepute, a number of psychologists, notably Humprey (1921), 
Allport (1924), and Holt (1931), accounted for modeling behavior in 
terms of associative principles. 
With the advent of reinforcement principles, theoretical explana-
tions of learning shifted the emphasis from classical conditioning to 
instrumental response acquisition based on reinforcing outcomes. 
Theories of modeling phenomena similarly assumed that the occurrence of 
observational learning is contingent upon reinforcement of imitative 
behavior. This point of view was most clearly expounded by Miller and 
Dollard (1941). Miller and Dollard's pioneering effort virtually 
founded the empirical study of imitation. Flanders (1968), however, 
states that while Miller and Dollard's emphasis on direct reinforcement 
was justified, their claim that imitation presupposes direct reinforce-
ment was false. 
When a person observes a model's behavior, but otherwise performs 
no overt response, he or she can acquire the modeled response while they 
are occurring only in cognitive, representational forms. Any learning 
under these conditions occurs purely on an observational or covert 
basis. Several theoretical analyses of observational learning assign a 
prominent role to representational mediators that are assumed to be 
acquired on the basis of a continguity learning process (Bandura, 1969, 
1965a; Sheffield, 1961). 
A General Overview of Modeling Research 
The behaviors of models often serve as discriminative cues for 
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observers in facilitating the expression of previously learned responses. 
Laboratory and field studies have shown that the probability of occur-
rence of a wide variety of neutral and socially approved behavior can be 
substantially increased as a function of witnessing the action of real-
life or symbolic models. Some behaviors that have been thus faciltiated 
include volunteering one's services (Rosenbaum, 1956; Schacter & Hall, 
1952), performing altruistic acts (Blake, Rosenbaum & Duryea, 1955; 
Bryan & Test, 1967; Harris, 1968), pledging oneself to a course of 
social action (Blake, Mouton & Hain, 1956; Helson, Blake, Mouton, & 
Olmstead, 1956), assisting persons in distress (Bryan & Test, 1967), 
seeking relevant information (Krumboltz & Thoresen, 1964), and selecting 
certain types of foods (Duncker, 1938), activities (Madsen, 1968), or 
articles (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963b). 
In the case of humans, a wide variety of response patterns differ-
ing considerably in content, novelty, and complexity have been transmit-
ted through modeling procedures under laboratory conditions. Among the 
diverse classes of behavior that have been developed are stylistic 
response patterns (Bandura, Grusec & Menlove, 1966; Bandura, Ross & Ross, 
1963b), distinctive modes of aggressive behavior (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 
1963a), dramatic play patterns (Marshall & Hahn, 1967), prosocial 
frustration reactions (Chittendon, 1942), and teaching styles (Feshback, 
1967). At an even higher level of complexity, it has been shown that 
through exposure to the behavior of models a person can acquire standards 
for self-reinforcement and self-evaluative responses (Bandura & Kupers, 
1964), conceptual behavior (Reed, 1960), moral judgmental orientations 
(Bandura & McDonald, 1963), self-imposed delay-of-gratification patterns 
(Bandura & Mischel, 1965), linguistic structures (Lovaas, 1966a), and 
distinctive phonetic variations in verbal behavior (Hanlon, 1964). 
The Effects of Modeling of Reinforcement to 
the Observer (Direct Reinforcement) 
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A number of studies have investigated the effect of reinforcement 
of the observer contingent upon the observer's imitating the model 
(Clark, 1965; Field, 1952; Hicks, 1965). The results of these studies 
strongly support the proposition that such reward increases imitation 
(Clark, 1965; Field, 1952; Hicks, 1965). Caution, however, should be 
taken in generalizing the above results beyond similar experimental 
situations. Studies have shown that when reward is made contingent 
upon the observer's task-success independent bf imitation, the tendency 
for the observer to imitate the model is decreased (Grusec, 1966; Kelly 
& Lamb, 1957; Kelman, 1950). 
The Effects of Modeling of Reinforcement to 
the Model (Vicarious Reinforcement) 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that social learning cannot be 
adequately explained in terms of direct reinforcement principles. A 
number of studies strongly support the hypothesis that vicarious reward 
will increase imitation of the model by the observer (Bisese, 1966; 
Clark, 1965; Marston, 1966; Willis, 1963). It has been further shown 
that vicarious reward effects are most likely to occur when the subject 
believes she or he will have to perform the task, and when the task has 
definable properties permitting a clear association between relevant 
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task stimuli, critical modeled behavior, and vicarious reward (Thelen & 
Rennie, 1972) • 
Modeling effects can be enhanced by the addition of reinforcement 
to the model (vicarious reinforcement) or to the observer (direct rein-
forcement). It has been argued that vicarious reinforcement has an 
effect primarily on the observer's performance of the imitative response, 
and that it does not represent a necessary condition for the acquisition 
of this behavior (Marlett, Jacobson, Johnson & Morrice, 1970). Bandura 
(1965a) suggests that the acquisition of matching responses results 
primarily from stimulus contiquity and associated symbolic responses, 
whereas the performance of observationally learned responses will depend 
to a great extent upon the nature of the reinforcing consequences to the 
model or the observer. Liebert and Fernandez (1970), however, state 
that vicarious consequences should affect both ~he performance and 
acquisition of modeled behavior. A study by Peed and Forehand (1973) 
further confirms this position. Thus, while most studies suggest that 
vicarious consequences affect performance, its effect on acquisition 
seems to be a source of dispute among researchers. 
The Effects of Antecedent Characteristics of the 
Model on the Behavior of the Observer 
Since repeated contigious stimulation alone does not always result 
in response acquisition, it is evident that additional conditions are 
required for the occurrence of observational learning (Bandura, 1969). 
A number of attention-controlling variables, some related to incentive 
conditions, others to observer characteristics, and still others to the 
properties of the modeling cues themselves, seem to be influential in 
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determining which modeling stimuli will be observer and which will be 
ignored. Selectivity of modeling stimuli may be partly a function of 
their inherent physical properties--for example, intensity, size, vivid-
ness, and novelty (Bandura, 1969). Of much greater importance for 
social learning, however, is the acquired distinctiveness of model 
attributes (Miller & Dollard, 1941). 
Studies concerning the effects of nurturance and sex of model have 
been contradictory and inconclusive (Flanders, 1968). Heatherington and 
Frankie (1967) found that nurturant models of either sex are imitated 
more, regardless of the sex of the observer. Rosenbaum (1956), however, 
found that nurturant models are imitated more by female observers. 
Other experiments failed to find any nurturance effects (Aronfreed, 
1964; Rosenhan & White, 1967). 
Concerning sex of model, Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1963) suggest 
that males imitate males and females imitate females only when the 
behavior is perceived by the observer as sex-appropriate. Still other 
investigators (May, 1966; O'Connell, 1965) have found the sex of the 
model to have no effect, while others (Heatherington & Frankie, 1967; 
Hicks, 1965) have found the sex of the model to have an interaction 
effect. 
The Effects of Characteristics of the 
Observer on Modeling 
An adequate theory of vicarious learning must explain why, under 
essentially identical conditions of modeling stimulation, some persons 
display higher levels of response acquisition than others. There is 
suggestive evidence that characteristics of observers, deriving from 
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their previous social learning experiences, may be associated with dif-
ferent observational patterns (Bandura, 1969). 
In general, research seems to suggest an inverse relationship 
between self-esteem of observer and imitation. De Charms and Rosenbaum 
(1960) and Gelfand (1962) have shown that subjects with high self-esteem 
display less matching behavior than subjects with low self-esteem. 
These studies tie in very nicely with the research in the area of self-
esteem and conformity. Janis (1954), Berkowitz and Lundy (1957), Lesser 
and Ableson (1959), and Linton and Graham (1959) have all found that 
persons low in self-esteem are more persuasible than those whose self-
regard is more substantial. In summary, research seems to suggest an 
inverse relationship between self-esteem and imitation (conformity). 
The relationship between dependency and imitation has been the sub-
ject of many studies. Bandura and Huston (1961) reported that high-
dependent children showed more imitative behavior than did low-dependent 
children. In the two studies of Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961, 1963), 
high-dependent children showed more imitation of aggression than did 
low-dependent children. Ross' (1962) study of the imitation of deviant 
behaviors also provides evidence for a positive relationship between the 
two variables. Indirect support for this relationship is also provided 
in studies by Cairns (1959), Endsley and Hartup (1960), and Jakubczak 
and Walters (1959). In general, research seems to suggest a direct 
relationship between dependency and modeling. 
Conclusions from Modeling Research 
What follows are some conclusions concerning the selected review of 
the literature on modeling. The earliest formulations regarded modeling 
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as an innate propensity. As the instinct doctrine fell into disrepute, 
modeling was accounted for in terms of associative principles. With the 
advent of reinforcement principles, theoretical explanations of learning 
shifted the emphasis from classical to instrumental response acquisition 
based on reinforcing outcome. Theories of modeling assumed that the 
occurrence of observational learning is contingent upon reinforcement 
of imitative behavior. Perhaps the most popular exponents of this view 
were Miller and Dollard. 
A general review of the imitation research was then made. It was 
noted that the behaviors of models of ten serve as discriminate cues for 
observers in facilitating the expression of previously learned responses. 
Studies have shown that the occurrence of a wide variety of neutral and 
socially approved behavior can be increased as a function of witnessing 
the action of real-life or symbolic models. It was also noted that a 
wide variety of response patterns differing considerably in content, 
novelty, and complexity have been transmitted through modeling proce-
dures. 
The modeling literature was also reviewed in terms of selected 
variables. Results concerning the effects upon imitation of presumed 
reward to the observer contingent upon the observer's imitation of the 
model strongly support the basic proposition that such reward increases 
imitation. Studies presented strongly support the hypothesis that 
vicarious reward will increase imitation of the model by the observer. 
It was shown, however, that vicarious reward effects are most likely to 
occur when the subject believes he or she will have to perform the 
modeled task, and when the task has definable properties permitting a 
clear association between relevant task stimuli, critical modeled 
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behavior, and vicarious reward. The differential effects of vicarious 
reinforcement on performance and learning were then discussed. Studies 
suggest that vicarious reinforcement definitely effects performance of 
behavior. It's effect on learning, however, is inconclusive. The 
effects of various antecedent characteristics of the model were also 
researched. Studies of the effects of nurturance and sex of model were 
contradictory and inconclusive. 
Studies were then reviewed concerning the effects of states and 
traits within the observer on imitation behavior. The relationship 
between imitation and self-esteem was also discussed. In general 
research seems to suggest an inverse relationship between self-esteem 
and imitation. Finally, studies were discussed that generally supported 
a linear relationship between dependency and imitation. 
Modeling and Prestige of Model 
Increased imitation of models who are older, more skillful, or who 
possess high social status was predicted by Miller and Dollard (1941) and 
Bandura and Walters (1963). Predictions about social status have been 
supported by demonstrating increased imitation of models with higher 
social status (Harvey & Rutherford, 1960; Lefkowitz, Blake & Mouton, 
1955) and decreased imitation of models whose social status was removed 
Shafer, 1965). 
Gelfand (1962) and Mausner (1954) found increased imitation of 
models who demonstrated attributes and skills thought to be successful 
in earning material rewards and social approval. Increased imitation 
was also found of models who occupied a prestigious place in a seniority 
or occupational hierarchy (Bandura & Kupers, 1963; Jakubczak & Walters, 
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1959). Blake and Mouton (1955), in a study determining the rate of 
violation of a given law, found that the power of others to increase or 
decrease the strength of a prohibition is a function of "who the others 
are." When high status people were known to accept a certain law it 
had the effect of making the law more acceptable than if only low status 
people are known to conform. Communication from a high prestige source 
was found to result in more opinion change in subjects than communica-
tion from low prestige sources (Kelman & Houland, 1953). Both empirical 
and experimental bases exist for the prediction of greater influence on 
other members by the leader and other high ranking members of the in-
formal group or gang (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943). It has also been 
found that when the agent of reward is a high-prestige person reinforce-
ment procedures are more effective than when the reinforcers are dis-
pensed by a person of low prestige (Prince, 1962). 
In short, support has been found for the prediction that observers 
more readily imitate models of higher status. 
Anxiety and Modeling 
Research cited earlier in this review shows that high-anxiety sub-
jects tend to be less content with themselves and to have lower self-
esteem than low-anxious subjects. Other studies have suggested that 
high-anxiety subjects are more dependent than low-anxiety subjects. 
Subjects high in dependency and low in self-esteem have been found to 
be highly suggestible. It has indeed been found that anxious subjects, 
who tend to have both these characteristics, are more suggestible and 
more susceptible to persuasion than low-anxiety subjects. Following 
this line of though are studies showing that high-anxiety subjects are 
more susceptible to the influence of social models. 
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One may ask the question: why should anxiety affect modeling 
behavior? To answer this question, one can examine a modeling situation 
through the eyes of an anxious person. An anxious person tends to have 
lower self-esteem and higher dependency needs than a low-anxious person. 
Studies, incidentally, have shown that both these characteristics lead 
to an increase in imitation. The high-anxiety person, viewing a situa-
tion in which he or she must respond, has two choices: to respond 
independently or look to one's environment for help. It seems reason-
able that highly anxious persons would strive especially hard to uncover 
environmental cues which might assist them in problem solving. This 
would tend to stem from their lack of confidence in their own abilities, 
their lack of sureness concerning themselves, and their general tendency 
to be dependent on other people. What better cue as to how to behave 
than the behavior of another? It would follow that high-anxiety subjects 
would tend to model more than low-anxiety subjects. 
Studies on Anxiety and Modeling 
A small number of studies have looked at the relationship between 
anxiety and modeling. Schacter and Singer (1962) employed a technique 
to produce a state of physiological arousal by the injection of a 
sympathomimetic amine, epinephrine. With slight exceptions, this agent 
provokes a pattern of physiological activation which is a virtual 
replica of the state produced by active discharge of the sympathetic 
nervous system. In experimental situations designed to make subjects 
euphoric, those subjects who received injections of epinephrine were, 
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on a variety of indices, somewhat more euphoric than subjects who 
received a placebo injection. Similarly, in situations designed to make 
subjects angry and irritated, those who received epinephrine were some-
what angrier than subjects who received placebo. Schacter and Singer 
(1962) suggested that, given a state of physiological arousal for which 
an individual has no innnediate explanation, one will label this state 
and describe one's feelings in terms of the cognitions available. 
Another way of explaining the results of this study could be as follows: 
a high degree of experimentally induced arousal led subjects to imitate 
the emotional reactions of stooges more than less aroused (placebo) sub-
jects. Schacter and Singer (1962) suggest highly aroused subjects 
imitate more than subjects who are less aroused. 
The results of this study, however, have been questioned (Schacter 
& Wheeler, 1962). In both sets of conditions, the differences between 
epinephrine and placebo subjects were significant, at best, at border-
line levels of statistical significance. Assuming, for the moment, that 
physiological arousal is a necessary component of emotional states, one 
of the factors that might account for this failure to find larger dif-
ferences between epinephrine and placebo subjects can be explained in 
the following manner. It is highly possible that the placebo subjects 
also experienced some unspecified degree of physiological arousal during 
the experiment. The injection of placebo does not prevent self-arousal 
of the sympathetic system, and indeed there is considerable evidence 
that the arousal of an emotional state is accompanied by general excita-
tion of the sympathetic nervous system (Woodworth & Schosberg, 1958). 
Thus, the failure to find larger differences between the epinephrine and 
placebo subjects could be a direct result of a smaller difference in 
arousal levels than was expected. 
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A test of the proposition at stake, then, would require comparison 
of subjects who have received injections of epinephrine with subjects 
who, to some extent, are rendered incapable of self-activation of the 
sympathetic nervous system. Thanks to a class of drugs known generally 
as autonomic blocking agents, such blockage is, to some degree, possible. 
If the proposition that a state of sympathetic discharge is a necessary 
component of an emotional experience is correct, it should be antic-
ipated that whatever emotional state is experimentally manipulated, it 
should be most intensely experienced by subjects who have received 
epinephrine, next by placebo subjects, and least of all by subjects who 
have received injections of an autonomic blocking agent. A study of 
this type was done by Schacter and Wheeler (1962). Schacter and Wheeler 
(1962) extended the range of manipulated sympathetic activation by 
employing three experimental groups: epinephrine, placebo, and a group 
injected with the sympatholytic agent, chlorpromazine. Laughter at a 
slap-stick movie was the dependent variable and the evidence was con-
vincing that amusement was a direct function of manipulated sympathetic 
activation. In other words, epinephrine subjects were more aroused than 
were placebo subjects, who in turn were more aroused than chlorpromazine 
subjects. Taken together, these studies suggest that an increase in 
arousal will lead to an increase in the imitation of an emotional state. 
Bandura and Rosenthal (1966) investigated the effects of emotional 
arousal, manipulated both psychologically and physiologically, on 
vicarious classical conditioning processes. Five groups of observers 
underwent procedures designed to induce differential degrees of arousal. 
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Observers then participated in a vicarious aversive conditioning par-
adigm in which a model exhibited pain cues in conjunction with an 
auditory stimulus. The acquisition and extinction of observers' emo-
tional responses to the conditioned stimulus were studied. The results 
disclosed that conditioned emotional responses can be transmitted vicar-
iously. In addition, the overall findings revealed that the observers' 
emotional arousal was a significant determinant of vicarious condition-
ing. This was shown by the fact that frequency of conditioned responses 
was a positive function of the degree of psychological stress. In other 
words, as the degree of arousal induced by a psychologically stressing 
situation increased, subjects became increasingly susceptible to the 
influence of models. In this case what the subjects imitated was a 
classically conditioned response. 
Sarason, Pederson, and Nyman (1968) observed the effects of high, 
middle, and low test-anxiety on a verbal learning experiment. The sub-
jects were female undergraduates. Prior to, and independent of, the 
experiment the subjects were administered a 37 item Test Anxiety Scale 
(TAS). The score distribution was divided into thirds, defined as high, 
middle, and low test-anxious groups. There were seven experimental 
conditions, four of which required the use of models. In two of these 
observational conditions, observation condition (O) and reverse observa-
tion condition (RO), the subject was instructed to observe the model. 
In the remaining two observational conditions no such instructions were 
given to the subject. Evidence was gathered which suggested that higher 
test-anxiety scores were more associated with a beneficial observation 
effect than were lower ones. From this it may be possible to make the 
statement that high test-anxious subjects tend to model more than less 
test-anxious subjects. 
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However, a few problems exist here. It was shown that in the 
modeling conditions where the subject was directly told to watch the 
model (0 and RO conditions), high TAS imitated more than low TAS. In 
the conditions, however, where modeling/observation was possible but not 
directed, the difference between high TAS and low TAS was actually non-
existent. It seems quite possible that differences in performance 
between high and low TAS in the 0 and RO conditions were due, not to the 
effect of anxiety on modeling, but to the demand characteristics of the 
experimental situations. It is possible that what was measured was not 
so much the influence of anxiety on modeling behavior as the tendency 
of the highly anxious individual to be more conforming and appeasing than 
the low-anxious individual. Clearly a more rigorous test of this rela-
tionship is needed. 
Bauer (1978) designed a study to clarify the effects of the demand 
condition on the anxiety/modeling relationship. Eighty female under-
graduate subjects were used. Forty subjects underwent relaxation proce-
dures and were, in terms of Spielberger's State Anxiety Inventory (STAI), 
more relaxed than the average undergraduate female. Forty subjects 
underwent anxiety induction procedures and were, in terms of STAI scores, 
more anxious than average. The subjects were then exposed to either a 
fast model or a slow model negotiating a maze. One-half of these sub-
jects were directly instructed to observe the model (Demand condition), 
whereas the remainder of the subjects were merely seated in the exper-
imental room and told to wait their turn (Non-demand condition). A 
visual fixation measure was taken to determine the amount of time 
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subjects actually spent observing the model. After observing the model, 
subjects were required to perform the maze. A post-experimental STAI 
was given to determine any changes in anxiety level. The time needed to 
complete the first four choicepoints of the maze, the total time needed 
to complete the maze, and change in anxiety level (post-test minus pre-
test) were used as measures of performance. 
No significant correlation was found between the time spent observ-
ing the model and the time taken to complete the maze. This suggests 
that the length of time a subject observes the model has little or no 
effect on the extent of modeled behavior that occurs. Anxious subjects 
tended to imitate the model more than relaxed subjects when observing 
a slow model, but no significant differences were found when subjects 
observed a fast model. Failure to obtain a difference between anxious 
and relaxed subjects in the fast model condition can perhaps be explained 
by methodological difficulties leading to a restriction of range effect. 
Anxious subjects tended to imitate more than relaxed subjects in the slow 
model, demand condition for both the speed-related dependent variables. 
In the slow model, non-demand condition, however, anxious subjects tended 
to imitate more than relaxed subjects only when the dependent variable 
was total time to complete the maze. 
The effect of the demand condition still seems to be uncertain. 
There is a tendency for the demand condition to enhance imitation tend-
encies; however, there was no significant difference between the demand 
and non-demand condition in terms of imitation. Overall, however, this 
study does offer partial support for the hypothesis that anxiety leads 
to increased modeling behavior. 
Anxiety and Prestige of Model 
Numerous studies have found increased imitation of models with 
higher social status (Harvey & Rutherford, 1960; Lefkowitz, Blake & 
Mouton, 1955). Increased imitation has also been found, of models 
demonstrating skills thought to be successful in earning rewards and 
social approval (Gelfand, 1962). A similar result has also been found 
for models occupying a prestigious place in an occupational hierarchy 
(Bandura & Kupers, 1963). Clearly the literature suggests that the 
prestige or status of the model has a strong effect on the observers' 
imitation tendencies. 
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Characteristics of the model (e.g., prestige) may affect the imita-
tion tendencies of an observer. Imitation by the observer may also be 
affected by certain characteristics of the observer. One such charac-
teristic is anxiety. There have been a number of studies that have 
studied the relationship between anxiety and modeling. It has been found 
that highly aroused subjects tend to imitate an emotional state more so 
than less aroused subjects (Schacter & Wheeler, 1962). It has also been 
found that a high degree of arousal leads to a greater degree of imita-
tion of classically conditioned responses (Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966). 
The literature has little to say about the effect of anxiety on imita-
tion that is cognitively complex. Sarason et al. (1968), using a serial 
learning task, found that high test-anxious subjects imitated more than 
low test-anxious subjects. 
Anxious observers seem to imitate a model more than non-anxious 
observers. One may wonder as to the effect of various characteristics 
of the model on the anxiety/modeling relationship. More specifically, 
what is the effect of prestige of the model on this relationship? A 
review of the literature has yielded no research pertaining to this 
question. 
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CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Selected reviews of the areas of anxiety and modeling have been 
presented. The characteristics of an anxious individual (e.g., lack of 
confidence, dependency, suggestibility) would seem to predispose the 
anxious individual to pay close attention to the behavior of others in 
an attempt to best behave in his or her world. There has been a number 
of studies that have looked at anxiety and modeling. Schacter and 
Wheeler (1962) and Schacter and Singer (1962) found the highly aroused, 
more agitated subjects tend to imitate a pattern of behavior more so 
than less aroused subjects. Bandura and Rosenthal (1966) found a high 
degree of arousal due to psychological stress led to a greater degree of 
imitation of classical conditioned responses. Sarason et al. (1968) 
found that high test-anxious subjects imitated more than low test-anxious 
subjects. Bauer (1978) found increased imitation tendencies in anxious 
subjects. The anxious observer seems more prone to imitate a model than 
a non-anxious observer. However, the literature has very little to say 
concerning the effects of antecedent characteristics of the model on an 
anxious observer. It has been found that the prestige of the model is a 
very important determinant in the observer's imitation behavior. 
In an uncertain situation, the suggestibility and dependency needs 
of the anxious individual would seem to lead such an individual to seek 
out a powerful, successful other upon whom to base one's own behavior. 
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The propsed study attempted to study the effects of prestige of model on 
the anxious observer. The two-part conceptual status of anxiety suggests 
that a more complete investigation of anxiety would consider both state 
and trait anxiety. Subjects were thus divided into four groups according 
to their levels of state and trait anxiety: (1) high level of state and 
trait anxiety, (2) low level of state and trait anxiety, (3) high state/ 
low trait anxiety, (4) low state/high trait anxiety. Subjects were then 
given the opportunity to observe a high prestige model, a low prestige 
model, or no model. The model negotiated a pencil maze in a relatively 
slow time of 70 seconds. The subjects were then required to run the 
maze. Data was analyzed in terms of a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design. The 
three factors were: prestige level, state anxiety level, and trait 
anxiety level. 
It was hypothesized that: 
1. Subjects exposed to the model would complete the maze slower 
than subjects not exposed to a model. Studies have shown that 
stylistic response patterns have been transmitted through model-
ing procedures (Bandura, Grusec & Menlove, 1966). 
2. Subjects exposed to the high prestige model would complete the 
maze slower than subjects exposed to the low prestige model. 
Research has shown increased imitation of models with higher 
social status (Harvey & Rutherford, 1960). 
3. The mean time needed to perform the maze would be greater for 
subjects with high levels of state and trait anxiety than for 
subjects with low levels of state and trait anxiety. Previous 
research has found that high-anxious subjects tend to imitate 
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more than low-anxious subjects (Sarason et al., 1968; Bauer, 
1978). 
4. Subjects high in state and/or trait anxiety would complete the 
maze slower than subjects low in state and/or trait anxiety 
when exposed to a high prestige model. 
No hypothesis concerning the varying effects of state vs. trait 
anxiety on imitation behavior has been made due to a lack of research on 
this specific question. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
One hundred and twenty female college students enrolled in Intro-
ductory Psychology classes at Oklahoma State University participated in 
this experiment for extra credit. These students were of freshman or 
sophomore status and between the ages of 18 and 22 years. 
Materials 
The State Anxiety Scale (A-State) and the Trait Anxiety Scale 
(A-Trait) of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory developed by Spielberger 
(1967) were used in this study. The State Anxiety Scale consists of 20 
statements that require subjects to indicate how they feel at a partic-
ular moment in time, in this case the present (see Appendix A for STAI-A 
State Scale). State Anxiety is conceptualized as a transistory emotional 
state--a condition of the human organism that is characterized by sub-
jective, consciously perceived feelings of tension and apprehension and 
heightened autonomic nervous system activity. A-State may vary in 
intensity and fluctuate over time. 
The Trait Anxiety Scale is similar to the state scale with the 
exception that subjects are required to state how they generally feel. 
Trait Anxiety refers to relatively stable individual differences in 
32 
anxiety proneness, that is, to differentiate between people in the 
tendency to respond to situations perceived as threatening with eleva-
tions in A-State intensity (see Appendix B for STAI-A Trait Scale). 
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The conceptions of trait and state anxiety that guided this construction 
of the STAI are considered in greater detail by Spielberger (1966). 
The range of possible scores on the STAI varies from a minimum 
score of 20 to a maximum score of 80 on both the A-State and A-Trait 
subscales. The mean score for undergraduate females similar to those 
used in this study has been found to be 35.12 on the A-State Scale and 
38.25 on the A-Trait Scale (Spielberger, 1970). The mean score for a 
female undergraduate on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory is based on 
a sample of 231 female undergraduates at Florida State University. 
Evidence of the concurrent validity of the STAI A-Trait Scale was 
obtained by correlating it with the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Cattel and 
Schier, 1963) and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS) (Taylor, 
1953). The correlations between the STAI, the IPAT, and the TMAS are 
moderately high for both college students and clinical patients. These 
correlations range from .75 to .83. 
Evidence bearing on the construct validity of the A-State scale is 
available for a sample of 977 undergraduate college students at Florida 
State University. These students were first administered the A-State 
scale with the standard instructions (Norm condition). They were then 
asked to respond how they believed they would feel "just prior to the 
final examination in an important course" (Exam condition). The mean 
score for the A-State scale was considerably higher in the Exam condition 
than in the Norm condition for both males and females. Furthermore, all 
but one of the items significantly discriminated between these conditions 
for the males, and all of the items were significantly higher in Exam 
condition for females. Further evidence concerning STAI validity is 
provided by Spi.elberger et al. (1970). 
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Test-retest reliability data on the STAI was obtained from sub-
groups of subjects who were included in the normative sample of under-
graduate college students. The test-retest correlations for the A-Trait 
scale were reasonably high, ranging from .73 to .86. Given the tran-
sitory nature of anxiety states, measures of internal consistency such as 
the alpha coefficient would seem to provide a more meaningful index of 
reliability of A-State scales than test-retest correlations. Alpha coef-
ficients for the STAI scales were computed by Formula K-R 20 as modified 
by Cronbach (1951) for the normative 'samples. These reliability coeffi-
cients ranged from .83 to .92 (Spielberger et al., 1970). 
A cassette tape recording of a relaxation technique developed by 
Andre Weitzenhof fer (unpublished manuscript) was used to induce relaxa-
tion in the subjects (see Appendix C for relaxation procedure) •. This 
tape was seven minutes long. To induce anxiety, a cassette tape record-
ing was used (see Appendix D for anxiety induction procedure) containing 
instructions and a difficult philosophical passage from a book entitled 
Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis by Menard Boss (1963). The tape was 
three minutes in length. A cassette recorder was used to play these 
tapes. 
A BRS Foringer pencil maze was used in the second (modeling) phase 
of the study. This maze was basically a flat sheet of metal 10.2 cm 
wide, 25.4 cm long, and 3.2 mm thick. A total of 10 horizontal slots 
·ran parallel to the edge of the maze nearest the subject. Vertical slots 
were attached to each end of the horizontal slots, one ending in a cul, 
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the other connecting to the center of the next horizontal slot. Thus, 
there was a total of 10 right-left decision points. The slots were cut 
cbmpletely through the metal and were large enough to allow entry of a 
sharpened pencil. A sharpened number two pencil was provided for both 
model and subject. Medium bond paper 8 1/2" x 11" was placed beneath 
the maze to record errors in maze running. In the modeling phase of the 
study a pair of goggles was used to blindfold the subject when the sub-
ject was running the maze. The goggles were shaped like a mask, com-
pletely enclosing both eyes. These goggles cut off any vision when worn 
by the subject. A Time Study 7451 stopwatch was used to obtain the 
subject's response time in running this maze. A stopwatch of a similar 
model was used by experimental assistants (located behind a one-way 
mirror) in a second experimental room to record the actual amount of 
time the subject observed the model. A pilot study was run to insure 
the interjudge reliability of this procedure. 
Both phases of the experiment used experimental rooms. In the first 
phase of the study an experimental room was used that contained a table 
measuring 2.4 x .65 m and two wooden chairs. These chairs were used by 
experimenter I and the subject. Both subject and experimenter were 
seated at the table. The second phase of the study was conducted in an 
experimental room 10 m down the hall. This room contained a table meas-
uring 3 x .8 m, two wooden chairs, and a one-way mirror. Experimental 
room number two also contained a podium measuring 2.5 m high x 1 m wide x 
.5 m long. The podium was used by experimenter II to store materials. 
One chair was placed at the table. This chair was used by the model 
when she ran the pencil maze. Across the table and approximately 3.5 m 
away the second chair was placed. This chair was used by the subject. 
The location of the chair was such that the subject could not see the 
maze itself. 
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A rating scale, developed for the purpose of recording prestige 
ratings of the models by the subjects, was also used in this study (see 
Appendix F for prestige rating scale). 
Procedure 
Phase I 
The first part of the study dealt with a determination of the trait 
anxiety level of the subject and a manipulation of the subject's state 
anxiety level. The subjects were met by Experimenter I in a location 
designated as the waiting room. Experimenter I was a male college stu-
dent 22 years of age majoring in psychology. Experimenter I introduced 
himself to the subject and directed the subject to experimental room 
number one. The experimenter then seated the subject and administered 
the STAI (Trait Scale) to the subject. The STAI was scored by the 
experimenter and the subject then underwent anxiety reduction or relaxa-
tion procedures. 
Subjects scoring above the mean for an undergraduate female on the 
trait scale were considered trait-anxious whereas those scoring below 
the mean were considered non-trait anxious. After anxiety induction or 
relaxation procedures were completed, subjects were given the STAI 
(State Scale) to determine if they were sufficiently anxious or non-
anxious to be used in phase two of the study. Of the subjects who 
underwent anxiety induction, those scoring above the mean for a female 
undergraduate were considered state anxious and asked to continue in 
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the second phase of the study. The others were dismissed. The subjects 
exposed to the relaxation procedures who scored less than the mean on 
the state scale were considered non-state anxious and also asked to con-
tinue in the second phase. The subjects scoring above the mean were 
dismissed. The procedures were continued until 120 subjects were 
gathered with the following combinations of state and trait anxiety: (1) 
30 subjects high in both trait and state anxiety, (2) 30 subjects high in 
trait and low in state anxiety, (3) 30 subjects low in trait and high in 
state anxiety, (4) 30 subjects low in both trait and state anxiety. The 
STAI (A-Trait) score for subjects in the high trait/high state group 
ranged from 39 to 66 with the mean score being 47.2, while the STAI 
(A-State) scores in this group ranged from 42 to 70 with the mean score 
being 51.4. The STAI (A-Trait) scores for subjects in the high trait/low 
state group ranged from 39 to 51 with the mean being 42.2, while the STAI 
(A-State) scores in this group ranged from 20 to 34 with the mean being 
27.2. The STAI (A-Trait) scores for subjects in the low trait/high state 
group ranged from 22 to 38 with the mean score being 33.9, while the STAI 
(A-State) scores in this group ranged from 39 to 63 with the mean score 
being 46.9. The STAI (A-Trait) score for subjects in the low trait/low 
state group ranged from 22 to 37 with the mean score being 29.8, while 
the STAI (A-State) scores in this group ranged from 20 to 34 with the 
mean score being 24.9. 
In the anxiety induction procedure, Experimenter I explained to the 
subject that the remaining part of Phase I of this study might be rather 
anxiety-provoking and that it would begin by listening to a tape record-
ing. The subject was told to listen carefully and follow the directions 
that it contained. The tape recording was then played (see Appendix D 
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for the instruct:l.ons and anxiety-induction procedure). Briefly, the 
subject was told that she would be required to listen to a passage, 
comprehend its meaning and communicate this to a group of judges who 
would analyze her communication style. The passage was a rather 
complicated essay by Menard Boss (1963) on The Psychoanalytic Conception 
of a Idea. After the tape was finished the experimenter again reminded 
the subject that she would be evaluated on this material later. The 
state scale of the STAI was then administered to the subject. Admin-
istration of this inventory was alluded to in the tape. The final 
instructions on the tape mentioned that as an aid to the judges in 
evaluating your communication style a personality inventory would be 
given. In a series of pilot studies it was found that this tape record-
ing would consistently increase the level of state anxiety in under-
graduate females. As an added precaution to insure that subjects are 
state-anxious, any subject scoring below the mean (35.12) for under-
graduate females was dismissed. Subjects scoring above the mean were 
told by Experimenter I that the second part of the study would deal with 
their ability to learn how to run a pencil maze. The subject was also 
told that further directions would be given to her by the experimenter 
running that part of the experiment. Experimenter I then ushered the 
subject to the open door of experimental room number two. Upon doing 
this, Experimenter I returned to his room to prepare for the next sub-
ject. 
In the relaxation procedure it was explained to the subject that 
this part of the study dealt with a relaxation exercise. The subject 
was then told to listen to the tape and follow the direcions it con-
tained. This relaxation procedure was adapted from a hypnotic induction 
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technique developed by Andre Weitzenhoffer (unpublished manuscript). 
Briefly, the tape consisted of suggestions to relax, to pay attention to 
the speaker's voice, and to relax more deeply. A series of pilot studies 
showed that this procedure consistently reduced the level of state 
anxiety in undergraduate female subjects. The purpose of the relaxation 
procedure was to produce non-state anxious subjects. As an added pre-
caution to insure that these subjects were in a non-anxious state, the 
state scale of the STAI was administered immediately after listening to 
the tape. Any subject scoring above the mean for undergraduate females 
was dismissed. The remainder of the relaxation procedure is identical 
to that of the anxiety induction procedure. 
Phase II 
The second phase of the study dealt with the modeling procedure. 
There were essentially three different conditions in this part of the 
study. Two of these conditions required the use of a model. The two 
observational conditions were the high prestige model and low prestige 
model. 
High Prestige Model. Under this condition the subject was ushered 
to the door of experimental room number two by Experimenter I. Exper-
imenter II then introduced himself to the subject. The model in this 
condition was a very attractive 23 year old college student with a 
poised, self-confident demeanor. The model was wearing an expensive 
dress with a white laboratory coat over the dress. Experimenter II 
introduced the model as his technical advisor on this research project. 
He further explained that she was an expert in the field of perceptual-
motor learning, having earned her doctorate in experimental psychology. 
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The experimenter then told the subject that she would perform the maze 
as soon as his advisor (the model) had a chance to perform it to make 
sure that all the "bugs were out of it." The experimenter then directed 
the subject to seat herself in a chair placed approximately 3.5 m from 
the model's. The experimenter then assisted the model in preparing to 
run the maze by helping her with the goggles and placing her pencil in 
the starting point of the maze. When the model was ready to run the 
maze she told the experimenter that she would like him to time her. 
With the remark, "Ready, begin," the experimenter clicked on his stop-
watch. The model traced through the maze in approximately 70 seconds. 
(The average time, as determined by a pilot study, required to negotiate 
this maze without practice was 45 seconds). 
After the model had performed the maze, the experimenter removed 
the paper beneath the maze, examined it for approximately 15 seconds, 
and told the model that he would like her to do it again. The model 
again performed the maze in 70 seconds, after which the experimenter 
examined the tracing and remarked that it was done well. The model 
then removed her goggles, remarked that everything seemed in order, and 
left the experimental room. In all, this part of the procedure took 
approximately 3.5 minutes. 
In experimental room number two a one-way mirror was located 
directly behind the model allowing an excellent view of the subject 
seated across the room. While the model was running the maze, an exper-
imental assistant located behind the one-way mirror kept track with a 
stopwatch of the amount of time the subject spent observing the model. 
The time the subject spent visually fixated on the model was calculated 
as an aid to later interpretation of the modeling data (for example, 
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failure to model could be perhaps explained by failure to observe rather 
than failure to imitate what was observed). 
After the model left the room, the experimenter seated the subject 
in the chair the model had vacated and placed the blindfold on her. 
Instructions were then read by the experimenter (see Appendix E for 
instructions). These instructions briefly explained the maze-solving 
task to the subject. If the subject had no questions, the task was 
begun. The experimenter recorded the total time needed by the subject 
to complete the maze. After the task was completed, the subject was 
told to remove her blindfold. The subject was again asked to complete 
the state scale of the STAI. The subject was then asked to rate the 
person who performed the maze before her in terms of prestige. It was 
then explained that the experiment was over. The experimenter then 
debriefed the subject. The purpose of the arousal or relaxation proce-
dures was discussed and questions welcomed. After exploring with the 
subject her present feeling state and determining her not to be upset or 
stressed, the experimenter excused her. 
Low Prestige Model. Under this condition the subject was again 
ushered to the door of experimental room number two by Experimenter I. 
Experimenter II introduced himself to the subject and accompanied her 
into the experimental room where he pointed out the model to the subject. 
The model in this condition was a female college student who behaved and 
dressed as to appear somewhat inunature and adolescent-like. She was 
dressed in old blue jeans and a t-shirt with a heavy and inappropriate 
use of make-up. The model's hair was arranged in pig-tails and she was 
chewing a huge wad of gum. The experimenter, in discussing the model, 
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told the subject that she was a friend of his younger sister who wanted 
to find out what it was like to be a subject in an experiment. The 
experimenter further stated that as soon as this girl (the model) was 
done, then she (the subject) would perform the maze. The remaining part 
of this condition is the same as in the High Prestige Condition. 
No Model Condition. Under this condition the subject was met at 
the door of experimental room number two by Experimenter II. To equate 
time across groups, the experimenter spent approximately 3.5 minutes 
rearranging equipment. The subject was then escorted to the table, 
seated and blindfolded. Instructions were then read by the experimenter 
(see Appendix E for instructions). These instructions briefly explained 
the maze-solving task to the subject. If the subject had no questions, 
the task was begun. After the maze was completed, the subject was told 
to remove her blindfold and complete the state scale of the STAI. De~ 
briefing procedures were then ensued. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was calculated 
between the time needed to complete the maze and the amount of time the 
subject observed the model (visual fixation). It was found that sub-
jects who spent more time observing the model performed the maze slower 
than subjects who observed less (£ = .24, £. < .05). Interjudge reli-
ability of the visual fixation measure was checked by means of a pilot 
study (.E, = .99) involving 20 subjects. 
Since the subject's visual fixation had an effect on subsequent 
maze performance, the dependent variable, total time to complete the 
maze, was analyzed in terms of an analysis of covariance. Means for each 
cell of the design appear in Table I. The results of the analysis of 
covariance indicated a significant main effect of prestige (F = 23.79, 
df = 1, 71, £. < .001), and a significant prestige by trait anxiety inter-
action (!'_ = 7.13, df = 1, 71, £. < .01) (see Appendix G for sunnnary 
table). In Table II, mean times to complete the maze for subjects high 
and low in trait anxiety exposed to high prestige, low prestige, and 
no model conditions are presented. The prestige by trait anxiety inter-
action was investigated by means of a test of simple effects (see 
Appendix H). When high and low trait anxious subjects were compared at 
the three levels of the prestige condition, it was found that high trait 
anxious subjects performed the maze slower than low trait anxious 
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TABLE I 
MEAN TIMES TO COMPLETE THE MAZE FOR EACH CELL OF THE DESIGN 
High Low No 
Group Prestige Prestige Model 
High State Anxious High Trait Anxious 98.3 42.1 52.2 
Low Trait Anxious 73.2 65.0 45.5 
Low State Anxious High Trait Anxious 105.4 54.5 36.7 
Low Trait Anxious 77 .8 48.1 53.0 
Variable= total time to complete maze (seconds). 
TABLE II 
MEAN TIMES TO COMPLETE THE MAZE FOR HIGH AND 
LOW TRAIT ANXIOUS SUBJECTS EXPOSED 
TO HIGH PRESTIGE, LOW PRESTIGE, 
AND NO MODEL CONDITIONS 
Group High Trait Anxious Low Trait Anxious 
High Prestige Model 101.85 seconds 75.5 seconds 
Low Prestige Model 48.3 seconds 56.55 seconds 
No Model 44.45 seconds 49.25 seconds 
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subjects when exposed to a high prestige model (F = 8.28, df = 1, 71, 
.2. < .01). No other differences were found. When subjects exposed to a 
high prestige, low prestige, or a no model condition were compared at 
the two levels of trait anxiety, significant differences between means 
were found at both levels of trait anxiety. The Newman-Keuls test was 
then used to determine which means differed significantly from one 
another (see Appendixes I and J). It was found that both high and low 
trait anxious subjects exposed to a high prestige model performed the 
maze significantly slower than subjects in the low prestige and no 
model condition. No differences were found between subjects in the low 
prestige and no model condition at either level of trait anxiety. 
The second dependent variable ,investigated was change in subjects' 
STAI (A-State) score. Pre-test scores were taken after anxiety induc-
tion or relaxation procedures. Post-test scores were taken before de-
briefing procedures at the end of the experiment. In Table III, the 
means for pre-test and post-test STAI scores are presented for high and 
low state anxious subjects. These data were analyzed in terms of a 
multifactor analysis of variance with repeated measures on one factor 
(see Appendix K for sununary table). A significant main effect for state 
(F = 118.53, df = 1, 118, .2. < .001), and a significant state by trial 
interaction (!. = 67.48, .£!._ = 1, 118, .2. < .001) were found. The signif-
icant state by trial interaction was examined by means of a test of 
simple effects (see Appendix L for summary table). High and low state-
anxious subjects were found to differ significantly in terms of STAI 
scores on the pre-test measure (F = 185.0, df = 1, 236, .2. < .001). When 
pre-test measures were compared to post-test measures it was found that 
high state-anxious subjects underwent a significant decrease in anxiety 
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level (!. == 22.0, df = 1, 118, .E.. < .001). Low state-anxious subjects, 
however, underwent a significant increase in anxiety level (!_ = 48.03, 
df = 1, 118, .E.. < .001). Comparison of post-test measures indicated that 
a significant difference in anxiety level, in terms of STAI scores, 
still existed between high and low state-anxious subjects (!. = 10.8, 
df = 1, 236, .E.. < .01). 
TABLE III 
MEANS FOR PRE-TEST AND POST-TEST STAI (A-STATE) 
SCORES FOR HIGH AND LOW STATE-ANXIOUS 
SUBJECTS 
Group Pre-Test 
High State Anxious 49.25 
Low State Anxious 26.40 
Post-Test 
42.46 
36.73 
Hypotheses one and two were investigated by means of planned 
orthogonal comparisons. It was found that subjects observing a model 
performed the maze slower than subjects who had not observed .a model 
(!'. .. = 5.2, df = 1, 117, .E.. < .05). This finding, however, is mainly the 
result of the greater imitation of the high prestige model. No dif-
ferences were found between the low prestige and no model condition. 
Additionally, it was found that subjects observing a high prestige model 
performed the maze slower than subjects observing a low prestige model 
(.!. = 5.59, df = 1, 78, .E.. < .05). A t-test was used to examine hypothesis 
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three. Subjects high in state and trait anxiety were found not to differ 
significantly from subjects low in state and trait anxiety in their maze 
performance. 
Hypothesis four is a three-part hypothesis. A t-test was used to 
examine whether or not subjects high in state and trait anxiety differed 
from subjects low in state and trait anxiety when compared to a high 
prestige model. The results indicated no difference in maze speed 
between these two groups. The question of whether or not subjects high 
in state anxiety differ from subjects low in state anxiety was also 
examined by means of a t-test. No significant difference in maze speed 
was found between these two groups. The final part of hypothesis four 
has been reported earlier in this section. To review this finding, sub-
jects high in trait anxiety were found to perform the maze slower than 
subjects low in trait anxiety when exposed to a high prestige model. 
At the completion of the experiment, subjects rated the model they 
observed in terms of prestige. Analysis of mean ratings given to the 
high prestige and low prestige model indicated that subjects saw the 
high prestige model as having more prestige than the low prestige model 
(.!_ = 6.6, df = 78, .E.. < .001). 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The first hypothesis of this study dealt with the effect of observa-
tion of a model on the subjectts maze performance. It was hypothesized 
that subjects observing a model would complete the maze slower than sub-
jects not observing a model. Subjects observing a high prestige model 
performed the maze slower than subjects in the no model condition though 
no differences were found between the low prestige and no model condi-
tion. The modeling procedure was, thus, shown to be at least partially 
effective. The finding is in agreement with previous studies that have 
found that style of response can be transmitted through modeling proce-
dures (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963b). 
The second hypothesis of this study dealt with the effect of 
prestige of the model on the subject's subsequent tendency to imitate. 
It was hypothesized that subjects exposed to the high prestige model 
would imitate to a greater degree than subjects exposed to a low pres-
tige model. Support for this hypothesis was found. Subjects exposed to 
the high prestige model completed the maze slower than subjects exposed 
to the low prestige model. This finding supports prior research that 
has indicated increased imitation of models with higher social status 
(Harvey & Rutherford, 1960; Lefkowitz, Blake & Mouton, 1955). 
Hypothesis three dealt with the relationship between anxiety and 
imitation behavior. It was hypothesized that subjects with high levels 
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of state and trait anxiety would imitate to a greater degree than sub-
jects low in state and trait anxiety. Previous research has found that 
high-anxious subjects tend to imitate more than low-anxious subjects 
(Sarason et al., 1968). Support for this hypothesis was not found. 
Subjects high in state and trait anxiety did not perform the maze slower 
than subjects low in state and trait anxiety. These results are perhaps 
partly explained by the fact that prestige of model had a very strong 
effect on imitation behavior, and, therefore, on the subject's maze 
speeds. The analysis of differences between anxiety levels required a 
collapse of the prestige dimension. The collapse of the prestige dimen-
sion would have the effect of covering up differences due to anxiety 
level. A further discussion as to why the predicted differences were 
not found between subjects high in both state and trait anxiety and 
subjects low in both state and trait anxiety is pursued later in rela-
tion to hypothesis four. 
Examination of data pertinent to hypothesis four yields partial 
conformation of this hypothesis. It was hypothesized that subjects high 
in trait anxiety would imitate to a greater degree than subjects low in 
trait anxiety when exposed to a prestige model. Support for this 
hypothesis was found. Subjects high in trait anxiety completed the maze 
slower than subjects low in trait anxiety. It may be noted that the mean 
time for low trait-anxious subjects to complete the maze (75.5 seconds) 
is closer to the high prestige model's time (70 seconds) than is the mean 
time for high trait-anxious subjects to complete the maze (101.85 sec-
onds). The data, however, still suggest that high trait-anxious subjects 
imitated the model's style of running the maze more than low trait-
anxious subjects. The model negotiated the maze in 70 seconds after 
memorizing the correct choicepoints. A subject imitating the slow 
response style, but unfamiliar with the maze, would take considerably 
longer than the model to complete the maze. The finding that high 
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trait anxious subjects imitate a high prestige model more than low trait 
anxious subjects suggests that the relationship between prestige of 
model and imitation is not as straight-forward as previously thought. 
The prestige level of the model seems to affect imitative behavior to 
a greater degree with subjects who have a relatively consistent elevated 
level of anxiety proneness than with subjects less chronically anxious. 
No difference in imitation was found between high and low trait-
anxious subjects when exposed to a low prestige model. The low prestige 
model was, perhaps, not viewed by subjects at either level of trait 
anxiety as having the- qualities that would merit imitation. This is 
supported by the finding of no differences in maze performance between 
subjects in the low prestige and no model condition for both high and 
low trait anxious subjects. The high prestige model, however, seemed 
to be viewed by subjects at both levels of trait anxiety as having qual-
ities worthy of imitation. Subjects at both levels of trait anxiety 
completed the maze slower when observing a high prestige model than did 
subjects exposed to a low prestige or no model condition. However, as 
stated above, high trait-anxious subjects imitated more than low-trait 
anxious subjects. 
It was further hypothesized that subjects high in state-anxiety 
would imitate a high prestige model more than subjects low in state 
anxiety. This was not supported by the data. It would appear that 
trait anxiety is more important than state anxiety in determining sub-
sequent imitation. The inclination to model seems to be more determined 
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by what one habitually does rather than by a transitory emotional state. 
Modeling is perhaps more dependent on personality than situational var-
iables. In the past, most research concerning the relationship of 
anxiety to other variables (e.g., dependency, suggestibility) has used 
a trait measure of anxiety. It would be informative to see if the 
results of these studies could be replicated using a state measure of 
anxiety. 
It was also hypothesized that subjects high in both state and trait 
anxiety would imitate more than subjects low in both state and trait 
anxiety when exposed to a high prestige model. Though a definite trend 
towards significance was found, on the whole the data do not support 
this hypothesis. Failure to find support for this hypothesis can perhaps 
best be explained in terms of the Yerke-Dodson law (Vernon, 1974). This 
law states that for every task there is an optimum imtermediate level of 
arousal. It is maintained that the actual optimum spot on the arousal 
scale decreases as task complexity increases. It is possible that in-
creasing the anxiety level of a chronically anxious subject resulted in 
a "paralyzing effect. 11 This high degree of arousal could have had a 
detrimental effect on the subject's subsequent ability to pay attention 
to, or at least to benefit from, the model's activity. Research has 
shown anxious individuals faced with a high degree of threat show a loss 
in flexibility of intellectual function and a disorientation of visual-
motor coordination (Beier, 1951). It is also possible that further 
relaxation for a generally relaxed subject may also move that subject 
further away from his or her optimum performance level. In sum, 
increased anxiety for high trait-anxious subjects and increased relaxa-
tion for low trait-anxious subjects may have resulted in a slight 
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decrement in their ability to benefit from observing a model and also in 
their subsequent performance of the maze. 
A second dependent variable investigated was change in the subject's 
STAI (A-State) scores. Pre-test measures were taken to insure that the 
anxiety induction or relaxation procedures were effective. Post-test 
measures were taken to determine whether or not a change in the subject's 
level of anxiety had occurred during the experiment. Subjects in the 
anxiety induction condition were significantly more anxious on the pre-
test scores than subjects in the relaxation condition because of the 
experimental manipulation. 
As the experiment progressed, anxious subjects underwent a signif-
icant decrease in anxiety level, whereas relaxed subjects underwent a 
significant increase in anxiety. This can perhaps best be explained by 
the phenomenon of regression to the mean. In spite of the decrease in 
anxiety level of the anxious subjects, and the increase in anxiety level 
of relaxed subjects, the post-test scores of the anxious subjects were 
significantly higher than those of the relaxed subjects. Thus, the 
changes in STAI scores should not have adversely affected the results 
of the experiment. 
The visual fixation measure was taken on each subject as a possible 
aid to later interpretation of the modeling data. It was found that the 
time spent observing the model and the time taken to complete the maze 
were significantly correlated. Thus, differences found between subjects 
in this study were apparently related to the amount of time spent observ-
ing the model. Bandura (1969), in discussing the concept of imitation, 
stated that the probability of occurrence of ~ behavior is substantially 
increased as a functi.on of witnessing the action of a model. It would 
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seem then that modeling has two components: first, the observation of 
the behavior and second, the subsequent performance of the behavior. Is 
the determination as to whether or not modeling has occurred solely 
dependent upon the subsequent performance of the observed behavior; or 
.should the first component, the actual observation of the model, also be 
considered? If the observational component of modeling is important in 
the study of imitation, it would seem important to design modeling 
studies in which this aspect of modeling could be examined. The present 
study attempted to take into account the observational component of 
modeling. The differences found between subjects in this study are in-
dependent of the positive correlation between observation and maze per-
formance. Imitative behavior was found even with the effect of the 
subjects' varying lengths of observation time controlled for. 
In terms of improvement of this present study, the researcher would 
do two things. Extreme STAI scores (i.e., three standard deviations 
from the mean) would be thrown out in an attempt to decrease any adverse 
effects due to extreme arousal or relaxation. Another aspect of the 
study that could be changed is the particular behavior to be modeled. 
Tracing the pencil maze is a complex task, performance on which is prob-
ably determined by numerous variables in addition to the desire to 
imitate a model (e.g., intelligence, coordination, special abilities). 
In terms of future research it would seem important to again study 
the observational aspects of imitation by taking a visual fixation meas-
ure. Future research could also add new variables to the anxiety-
prestige of model relationship. It may be informative to study the 
effects of sex of model and sex of subject on this relationship. The 
finding that trait anxiety seems more important than state anxiety in 
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determining subsequent imitative behavior may perhaps be generalized to 
the relationship between anxiety and other variables (e.g., dependency). 
Research on the relative effects of trait and state anxiety in relation-
ship to other variables would thus seem worthwhile. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the effects of 
prestige of model on anxious observers. Anxious observers have been 
shown to imitate a model more than non-anxious subjects (Sarason et al., 
1968). One may wonder as to the effect of various characteristics of 
the model on the anxiety-modeling relationship. More specifically, what 
is the effect on prestige of the model on this relationship? In an un-
certain situation, the suggestibility and dependency needs of the anxious 
individual would seem to lead such an individual to seek out a powerful, 
successful other upon whom to base one's own behavior. A review of the 
literature has yielded no research pertaining to this question. To 
further clarify the anxiety-prestige of model relationship, measures of 
both state and trait anxiety were obtained from the subjects. 
The present study used 120 female subjects. The subjects were 
divided into four groups according to their levels of state and trait 
anxiety: (1) high level of state and trait anxiety, (2) low level of 
state and trait anxiety, (3) high state/low trait anxiety, and (4) low 
state/high trait anxiety. The level of state anxiety was experimentally 
manipulated by means of anxiety induction or relaxation procedures. 
Subjects were considered high or low in anxiety level depending on 
whether they were, in terms of STAI scores, more relaxed or anxious than 
the average undergraduate female on whom the STAI was standardized. 
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These subjects were then given the opportunity to observe a high-prestige 
model, a low-prestige model, or no model. The model negotiated a pencil 
maze in approximately 70 seconds. The subjects were then required to 
run the maze. A measure of the amount of time the subject was visually 
fixated on the model was also taken. It was hypothesized that: (1) sub-
jects exposed to a model would complete the maze slower than subjects not 
exposed to a model, (2) subjects exposed to a high prestige model would 
complete the maze slower than subjects exposed to a low prestige model, 
(3) subjects with high levels of state and trait anxiety would complete 
the maze slower than subjects with low levels of state and trait anxiety, 
and (4) subjects with high levels of state and/or trait anxiety would 
complete the maze slower than subjects with low levels of state and/or 
trait anxiety, when exposed to a high prestige model. 
The results of this study suggest that subjects with the opportunity 
to observe a model tended to imitate the model's style of response when 
the model was perceived as having high prestige. It was also found that 
the high prestige model was imitated to a greater degree than the low 
prestige model. Subjects high in state and trait anxiety did not differ 
from subjects with low levels of state and trait anxiety in their maze 
performance. The lack of difference between these two groups can perhaps 
be explained by the collapse of the prestige dimension and the adverse 
effect on performance of extremely high and extremely low levels of state 
anxiety. 
The data further revealed that subjects high in trait anxiety im-
itated a high prestige model more than subjects with a low level of trait 
anxiety. This finding suggests that the relationship between prestige of 
model and subsequent imitation of that model is, in part, determined by 
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the observer's proneness to anxiety. Subjects high in state anxiety did 
not differ in their maze performance from subjects low in state anxiety 
when exposed to a high prestige model. This suggests that modeling is 
more dependent on personality than transitory situational variables. 
Subjects high in state and trait anxiety did not differ in their maze 
performance from subjects low in state and trait anxiety. The lack of 
difference between these two groups can perhaps be explained by the 
adverse effect on performance of extremely high and extremely low levels 
of state anxiety. 
High state-anxious subjects were found to decrease in their STAI 
scores from pre-test to post-test. Low state-anxious subjects were 
found to increase in their STAI scores from pre-test to post-test. How-
ever, since there was a significant difference between high and low 
state-anxious subjects on their post-test measure, it is unlikely that 
these changes had an effect on the study. 
The results of this study also suggest that the amount of time sub-
jects spent observing the model is positively correlated with subsequent 
imitative behavior. In the present study imitative behavior was found, 
independent of the positive correlation between observation and maze 
performance, and it is suggested that future studies on imitation take 
into account both the observation and performance components of modeling. 
Future research should be designed to study the relative effects of 
state and trait anxiety in relationship to variables that have been cor-
related with anxiety (e.g., dependency). 
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Self-Evaluation Questionnaire 
Developed by c. D. Spielberger, R. L. Gorsuch 
and R. Lushene 
STAI Form X-1 
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Name--------------------------------------~ Date.~----------------~ 
Directions: A number of statements which people 
have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Read each statement and then blacken in the 
appropriate circle to the right of the statement 
to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at 
this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend too much time on any one statement 
but give the answer which seems to describe your 
present feelings best. 
Cl) 
Q.) 
.~ 
.µ 
~ 
Cf.I 
1. I feel calm . . . .. . 1 2 3 
2. I feel secure • . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 
3. I am tense 1 2 3 
4. I am regretful 1 2 3 
5. I feel at ease 1 2 3 
6. I feel upset 1 2 3 
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes • 11 2 3 
8. I feel reated • • . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 
9. I feel anxious 1 2 3 
10. t feel comfortable 1 2 3 
11. I feel self-confident • • 1 2 3 
12. I feel nervous 1 2 3 
13. I am jittery 1 2 3 
14. I feel "high strung" 1 2 3 
15. I am relaxed 1 2 3 
16. I feel content 1 2 3 
17. I am worried 1 2 3 
.µ 
Cl) 
0 
~ 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
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C/J 
H :>. 
aJ Cll 
l> ~ aJ co 
z aJ < 
.µ .~ .µ 
co .µ i:: C/J 
0 ~ aJ 0 s .µ s 
r-l 0 ~ r-l 
< tl.l 0 < 
18. I feel over-excited and "rattled" . . . . 1 2 3 4 
19. I feel joyful . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 
20. I feel pleasant . 1 2 3 4 
APPENDIX B 
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Self-Evaluation Questionnaire 
STAI Form X-2 
Directions: A number of statements which people 
have used to describe themselves are giv.en below. 
Read each statement and then blacken in the 
appropriate circle to the right of the statement 
to indicate how you generally feel. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much 
time on any one statement but give the answer 
which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
21. I feel pleasant • 
22. I tire quickly . . . . . . . 
23. I feel like crying 
24. I wish I could be as happy as others see~ to be • • 
25. I am losing out on things because I can't make 
up my mind soon enough • • • • 
26. I feel rested • • 
27. I am "calm, cool, and collected" 
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that 
I cannot overcome them • • • • • • • • 
29. I worry too much over something that really 
doesn't matter •••• 
30, I am happy 
31. I am inclined to take things bad 
32. I lack self-confidence 
33. I feel secure •• , • 
34. I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty 
35. I feel blue • • • 
36. I feel content 
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind 
and bothers me . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
s::: Q) 
.µ 
4-1 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 / 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
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4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
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Cl) 
1-1 :;:..., 
OJ Cll 
~ Ul ~ 
z OJ < 
.µ .~ .µ 
Ul .µ ffi Cl) 0 ~ 0 ~ .µ ~ 0 4-1 
< U) 0 < 
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't 
put them out of my mind . 1 2 3 4 
39. I am a steady person . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as 
I think over my recent concerns and interests 1 2 3 4 
APPENDIX C 
RELAXATION PROCEDURE 
74 
75 
Please make yourself comfortable in your chair. I would like you 
to relax. Pay close attention to my voice. Try to pay attention to it 
as much as you can. Should your attention wander away from it, that will 
be all right, just bring your attention back to it. After a while you 
may find that my voice seems to become faint or to recede from you or 
again changes in quality. That is all right. Should you get sleepier, 
that will be fine, too. Whatever happens, let it happen and just keep 
listening to my voice while you become more and more relaxed. More and 
more relaxed. Just listen and relax. Whatever you feel is happening, 
just let it happen. 
Relax completely. Relax every muscle of your body. Relax the 
muscles of your legs. Relax the muscles of your feet. Relax the muscles 
of your hands, of your fingers. Relax the muscles of your neck, of your 
chest. Relax all the muscles of your body. Let yourself be limp, limp, 
limp. Relax more and more, more and more. Relax completely. Relax com-
pletely. Relax completely. 
As you relax more and more, a feeling of heaviness comes over your 
body. A feeling of heaviness is coming into your legs and your arms, 
into your feet and your hands, into your whole body. Your legs feel 
heavy and limp, heavy and limp. Your arms are heavy, heavy. Your whole 
body feels heavy, heavier and heavier. Like lead. You are beginning to 
feel drowsy, drowsy, artd sleepy. Your breathing is becoming slow and 
regular. You are getting drowsy and sleepy, more and more drowsy and 
sleepy while your entire body becomes more and more relaxed, more and 
more relaxed. 
You are relaxed, quite relaxed. But you can relax even more if 
you allow yourself to do so. You will soon attain a state of deep, of 
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complete relaxation. You are becoming increasingly drowsy and sleepy. 
There is a pleasant feeling of warmth and heaviness throughout your body. 
You are losing interest in everything else but my voice. Soon there will 
be nothing else to attend to but my voice. All the while you keep becom-
ing more and more deeply relaxed. 
You are relaxed, very relaxed. There is a pleasant feeling of 
warmth and heaviness, of lethargy, all through your body. You are tired 
and drowsy. You want only to listen to my voice. Pay attention to 
nothing else but my voice. You have no cares, no worries now. You are 
pleasantly, deeply relaxed, getting more deeply relaxed all the time. 
Everything else but my voice is becoming remote, quite remote. Nothing 
else but my voice seems important, nothing else is important. Nothing 
else but my voice and what I have to say to you now seems of interest. 
And even my voice may come to you as in a dream as you relax more and 
more, as you sink deeper into this lethargy, this deep state of relaxa-
tion. Relax, relax, deeply relaxed. Deeper and deeper all the time. 
In a few moments you will be notified. You will feel pleasant and 
refreshed. 
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The research you are about to take part in is concerned with the 
analysis of interpersonal communication. Today's study deals with your 
ability to listen to a reading, comprehend its meaning and connnunicate 
this to a group of judges. A passage will be read to you. This passage 
contains eight ideas of major importance. Your task will be to listen 
to the passage and pick out these ideas. You will then be required to 
conununicate these ideas to a group of judges. The judges will then 
evaluate you on your ability to connnunicate the essential themes of the 
reading. In order to test your ability to retain these ideas as well as 
communicate them, you will be required to participate in another task 
before you talk to the group. It may be of some interest to you to know 
that the ability to understand and communicate ideas in this manner has 
been shown to have a strong relationship to general intelligence and 
basic personality adjustment. You will hear the passage read only once, 
so you must listen carefully and try to understand the ideas presented. 
I will now begin the passage. The passage is entitled, "The Conception 
of an Idea." 
The psychological conception of an "idea" is the starting point of 
contemporary psychology in general and of the psychoanalytic theory in 
particular. The psychoanalytic theory of neuroses asserts, for instance, 
that in hysteria unacceptable "ideas" are repressed. In obsessional 
neuroses, "ideas" are supposed to become detached from their accompany-
ing affect. 
Freud, then, too seems to take it for granted that we do have, some-
where within our consciousness or within our unconscious, ideas or mental 
images or psychic object-representations of all the objects of the 
external world which we have perceived. Almost all of us would at least 
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agree that such ideas, mental images, or intrapsychic object representa-
tions take place within ourselves, whether in the head or in the psyche 
or elsewhere. Among many of us there even seems to be more or less 
unanimous agreement that the physiological equivalents or "substrata" of 
these mental images in the brain would constitute their ultimate reality. 
At any rate, everybody will understand me if I state that I have formed 
an idea or a mental representation within me of the contents of a book 
which I have read recently, or of a chemical experiment which I have 
just carried out, of a football game I have been watching this afternoon, 
or of a picture which I see at this very moment on the opposite wall. 
On closer examination, however, our mutual understanding about our 
"ideas" of what we have seen or heard, about these mental images some-
where in our psyche, dwindles down to our being in agreement only on the 
same obscurities. In fact, not one of the constituents of our connnon 
phrase, "I have an idea," is clarified in the least. Actually, we do not 
know at all what we mean when we talk like that. We have "no idea" what 
the actual nature of an "I" is, nor have we any idea of the "substance" 
or the "essence" of a mental image of a psychic object-representation 
within ourselves; we are even less able to picture the possessive rela-
tionship between "I" arid such an "idea" of something. 
For centuries, philosophers have questioned whether ideas correspond 
to a reality extranious to our mind or soul, a reality which ideas sup-
posedly represent. Some philosophers say that they do, others say they 
do not; still others claim that the question cannot be decided. If 
philosophers are unable to agree on this question, it is best to refrain 
from philosophical speculation, and to investigate the immediately 
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perceptible phenomena themselves to which the conception of "idea" seeks 
to point. To do this is one of the many tasks of psychology. 
The passage is now complete. In order to aid the judges in analyz-
ing your style of communication, a questionnaire will be given to you by 
the experimenter. Please fill it out. 
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In this part of your participation in this study, we are going to 
test your maze-solving ability. Trace with this pencil (pencil is 
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placed in subject's hand and directed to the starting point) through the 
grooves and openings to the other end of the maze, always keeping the 
pencil tip touching the paper underneath. You will be required to keep 
trying until you correctly complete the maze. Do you have any questions? 
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Please rate the person who performed the pencil maze before you did 
in terms of prestige. Circle the appropriate number. 
1 
No 
prestige 
2 
Very 
little 
prestige 
3 
Low 
prestige 
4 
Average 
prestige 
(just 
another 
college 
student) 
5 
Prestigious 
6 
High 
prestige 
7 
Very high 
prestige 
APPENDIX G 
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TOTAL TIME TO COMPLETE THE MAZE 
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Source 
Within Cells 
State Anxiety 
Trait Anxiety 
Prestige (P) 
S X T 
s x p 
T X P 
S X TX P 
**.E. < .01 
***.E. < .001 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY TABLE FOR ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE OF 
TOTAL TIME TO COMPLETE THE MAZE 
SS df ms 
59546.040 71 838.676 
(S) 149.636 1 149.636 
(T) 2233.409 1 2233.409 
19951.187 1 19951.187 
1445.196 1 1445.196 
351.254 1 351. 778 
5983. 778 1 5983.778 
821.058 1 821.058 
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F 
0.18 
2.66 
23.79*** 
1. 72 
0.42 
7.13** 
0.98 
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THE MAZE: PRESTIGE BY TRAIT ANXIETY 
INTERACTION 
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Source 
T at pl 
T at P2 
T at P3 
Within Cell 
p at tl 
p at t2 
Within Cell 
TABLE V 
SIMPLE EFFECTS TEST FOR TOTAL TIME TO COMPLETE 
THE TASK: PRESTIGE BY TRAIT ANXIETY 
INTERACTION 
SS df ms 
6943.50 1 6943.50 
680.85 1 680.85 
230.30 1 230.30 
59546.04 71 838.68 
41181.30 2 20590.65 
7343.00 2 3671.50 
59546.04 71 838.68 
88 
F 
8.28** 
0.81 
0.27 
24.55*** 
4.38* 
t 1 = high trait anxious, t 2 = low trait anxious, pl = high prestige, 
p2 = low prestige, p3 = no model. 
*.E.. < • 05 
**.E.. < .01 
***.E.. < .001 
APPENDIX I· 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON ALL ORDERED PAIRS OF MEANS 
FOR HIGH TRAIT ANXIOUS SUBJECTS EXPOSED 
TO HIGH PRESTIGE, LOW PRESTIGE, 
OR NO MODEL 
89 
Prestige 
No Model 
Low Prestige 
High Prestige 
**.E.. < .01 
TABLE VI 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON ALL ORDERED PAIRS OF 
MEANS: HIGH TRAIT ANXIOUS SUBJECTS 
No Model Low Prestige 
Treatment 
Total 889 966 
889 77 
966 
2037 
r=2 
Critical Difference 485 
90 
High Prestige 
2037 
1148** 
1071** 
r=3 
552 
APPENDIX J 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON ALL ORDERED PAIRS OF MEANS 
FOR LOW TRAIT ANXIOUS SUBJECTS EXPOSED 
TO HIGH PRESTIGE, LOW PRESTIGE, 
OR NO MODEL 
91 
Prestige 
No Model 
Low Prestige 
High Prestige 
E. < • 05 
TABLE VII 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON ALL ORDERED PAIRS OF 
MEANS: LOW TRAIT ANXIOUS SUBJECTS 
No Model Low Prestige 
Treatment 
Total 985 1131 
985 146 
1131 
1510 
r=2 
Critical Difference 364.14 
92 
High Prestige 
1510 
525* 
379* 
r=3 
437.75 
APPENDIX K 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PRE-TEST AND 
POST-TEST STAI (A-STATE) 
SCORES 
93 
TABLE VIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PRE-TEST AND POST-TEST 
STAI (A-STATE) SCORES 
Source df MS 
Between Subjects 
State (S) 1 12084.204 
Subjects Within Groups 118 101.948 
Within Subjects 
Trial (T) 1 168.337 
S X T 1 4498.004 
Trial X Subjects Within Groups 118 66.650 
***.E.. < .001 
94 
F 
118.53*** 
2.53 
67.48*** 
APPENDIX L 
SIMPLE EFFECTS TEST FOR CHANGE IN 
SUBJECTS STAI SCORES: STA~E 
BY TRIAL INTERACTION 
95 
TABLE IX 
SIMPLE EFFECTS TEST FOR CHANGE IN SUBJECTS STAI 
SCORES: STATE BY TRIAL INTERACTION 
Source SS df MS 
High vs. Low Anxious 
for Pre-Test 15663.68 1 15663.68 
High vs. Low Anxious 
for Post-Test 917.00 1 917.00 
Within Cells 90545.93 236 84.30 
Pre-Test vs. Post-Test 
for High Anxious 1465.80 1 1465.80 
Pre-Test vs. Post-Test 
for Low Anxious 3201.30 1 3201.30 
Trial X Subject Within 
Groups 7865 .13 118 66.65 
**.E. < .01 
***.E. < .001. 
96 
F 
185.00*** 
10.80** 
22.00*** 
48.03*** 
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